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Coming Home
Thursday 05-22-2008 10:35am ET
           The mayor and his council didn’t know what to think; in this misogynistic-lite country, Iraqi men weren’t accustomed to having such a free-spirited and assertive woman (albeit a little kooky) in their office representing the United States.  “Lynn” worked for the State Department assisting my Civil Affairs team in reconstruction efforts for Diyala Province, approximately 40 miles north of Baghdad.

            Having spent time in the San Francisco area prior to my second deployment, I was accustomed to children of the sixties such as “Lynn” and as soon as the Iraqis realized she was there to give them money, they warmed up to her as well - in Iraq, nothing cuts the ice quite like the promise of cold, hard cash.

            We sipped chai as “Lynn” explained in her over-the-top personality, her plan to distribute forty, $1,000 micro-grants for women to start businesses in the city of Baqubah.  Not just any women though, it had to be widows whose husbands had been killed in the fighting or who were caring for orphans.  Now, far be it from me to poo-poo someone trying to help war widows and orphans, but I would have been just as happy with anyone opening a business in this war-ravaged and impoverished corner of Iraq, but when pitching reconstruction ideas at State, I guess it doesn’t hurt to use the “warm and fuzzy” factor.

            This was Phase II of the current surge strategy; with the insurgency sufficiently suppressed, we had created a window of opportunity for the Iraqi government to function.  Unfortunately, that window was about to close and they still had a long way to go before they could provide even the most basic of services on their own.  Bogged down in their own petty, sectarian bickering and apathetic to the greed and corruption that plagued the country, the government was squandering the relatively stability created by the surge by failing to unite and provide the electricity, water and fuel the people of Diyala so desperately needed.

            But even that wouldn’t be enough to fight the insurgency; we had to also wage peace through economic development and job creation.  We had to take away the insurgent’s most effective recruiting tools of poverty and despair while racing against his most powerful weapon – time.

            Unfortunately, “Lynn’s” micro-grant program never came to fruition.  Although it was well-received by the Iraqis and a committee was formed to process the hundreds of applications from the city’s pool of qualified widows, the program, intended to provide quick flash-to-bang stimulus, withered on the vine of government red tape.  Proper forms, further analysis and background checks were all cited by State in Baghdad as reasons for delays in the program’s approval and its eventual demise; there’s more than just a little irony in the largest bureaucracy in the history of world mentoring the most dysfunction al.

            This is the job of Civil Affairs, to create stability by returning normalcy.  It’s the war widow or orphan, the father with a family to feed and the unemployed military-aged male whose heart and mind we so desperately need to win and it is their suffering and despair that the insurgent seeks to exploit.  These are the people that need help the most and it is they who truly see it the least. 


These are the people who eek out an existence in this surreal environment.  They look and see rubble, unemployment and darkness.  These are the people for whom schools and medical care are a distant luxury.  They look and see foreign soldiers and concrete barriers and it is they who live in the aftermath of car bombs and suicide vests.  These are the people that wonder daily if their lives are truly better now than under Sadaam - a war of grand ideology doesn’t really mean as much to a guy as having a safe home, a job and food to feed his family.

            And that is the crux of the internal debate that rages in my head daily and will for years to come; after 5 years, have we make a positive difference in the lives of the Iraqis?  After five years have we created stability and disrupted the international reach of terrorists who may or may not have been present prior to 2003?  Do the people of Iraq truly desire freedom and democracy or is it viewed as just the imposition of another occupying Army like that of the British circa WWI or the Turks before them? 

            Can that fragile democracy withstand the likely onslaught of extremist groups like the Mahdi Army after the surge is over?  Can peace and stability truly exist in a country with such deep-rooted and ingrained religious intolerance or will that country deteriorate into another Lebanon?

            I’ve invested nearly two years of my life to Iraq.  Two years away from my family and my Low Country home.  Two years trying to make order from the chaos and sense from the senseless.  Many of the same problems I saw during my first tour in 2004 still persist today and are unlikely to change anytime soon, for can an American soldier truly be expected to fight a thousand years of hatred in a culture we do not really understand.

            And now, as I return home to Charleston, I’ll try to free myself from the Gordian knot that is our legacy in Iraq and attempt to reconcile the debate that rages daily in my head.  The entire time I’ve been over here, I’ve thought of little else but being home, but for the rest of life I’ll fight to keep this place from my thoughts and when I look at my wife and daughters, it will be difficult not to be reminded of the war widows and orphans of Diyala.


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Untitled
Friday 03-07-2008 7:00am ET
            It was time for our weekly meeting with the mayor of Muqdadiya, a few members of his council as well as the directors of the various municipal departments responsible for providing the basic services for the district.  In American military parlance these are known as Subjects of Interest or SOIs, anybody that we perceive to be a powerbroker, a person with influence or with what the Iraqis call wasta. 


            These are the people that we engage with the intent of collecting intel, creating stability and encouraging the Iraqi government to function on its own.  These are the people that engage us with the intent of getting as many US contracts and as much American money as possible; and in keeping with classic image of the crafty Arab trader, the Iraqis have a much easier time meeting their intent than we do ours.


            We sipped chai as they went around the table and poor-mouthed their departments, complaining about Provincial not freeing up the money for the district.  The Director of Electricity stated that he needed $4,000 to renovate his office and a Civil Affairs colleague from another battalion agreed to give it to him without further questioning.  The Director of Water and Sewer, not to be left out, asked for $4,000 as well and soon the other directors were haggling for a share of the kitty.


            Whether it’s a mayor, a councilmember, a municipal director, a village mukhtar, a contractor or just about anybody else that we engage in Diyala Province, the Americans are easily manipulated in to paying out thousands of dollars at a time with little effort;  we are a source of steady profit even though we do come with a relatively high overhead.  Too many Americans over here believe that projects equal progress or that we can buy peace and stability if we only spend enough of money.


            The US military has poured over a $140 million in Diyala for projects and contracts alone and that doesn’t include money spent by the State Department, the Corps of Engineers, USAID or any of the myriad of other US alphabet-agencies that operate in this country; this in spite of the province having the Iraqi dinar equivalent of $190 million in the ’08 budget and another $500 million earmarked for reconstruction projects.


            Schools, clinics, government offices, sewer lines, road repair, parks, fountains, soccer fields, power stations, communication towers, fuel stations, vehicles and other equipment; these are some of the projects where we have spent US tax dollars.


            Some of the contracts awarded include paying for villages to pick up their own trash, cleaning the canals, as well as the Iraqi Army delivering humanitarian assistance food and kerosene that we pay for and coordinate.  The latest big push by American forces is to stand-up what have been called Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) but are now called “Sons of Iraq” in an effort to put more of an local flavor on the whole concept.


            These are essentially neighborhood watch groups armed with AK-47s and identified by the new symbol of the modern American Army – the yellow, reflective belt.  They’re supposed to be temporary positions for locals to protect their communities until Iraqi Security Forces are stood up but often seem to only perpetuate the sectarian violence and religious intolerance that permeates this country.


            Sunni and Shia CLC’s, as well as the Shia dominated and heavily sectarian Iraqi Police, have all been implicated in the daily intimidation, extortion, kidnappings, murder, rape and torture that plague this religiously fractured province.  In the absence of the violence perpetrated by Al Qaeda, the void has been filled by extremist organizations, many of which are American-funded (and in some cases, Iranian supported) and now prolong the festering violence under the banner of “Sons of Iraq.”


            A one month CLC contract for a medium-sized village can run $50,000.  For a larger village or small city the contracts can go for more than $150,000 and the mayor of Muqdadiya had entered into just such a contract with my colleague from the other battalion some time ago.  Actually, the contract used to be in his name but was switched to his brother’s in an effort to “avoid the appearance of impropriety” in a country where skimming off the top is not only accepted, it’s institutionalized.


            That was his main reason for showing up at the meeting today; to collect this month’s installment.  He sat at the table and tried to convince my colleague to just give him the money now so that he could go home and spend some time with his family.  At in the afternoon, it was already a longer than average work day for our Iraqi SOIs.  Normally we hold this meeting earlier in the day to accommodate them but a suicide bomber in a nearby market that morning had our attention elsewhere.


            In spite of the bombings that always grab the media’s attention, the security situation here could be a lot worse.  “If it bleeds, it leads.”  It’s a lot easier to show the chaos of a bombing in a 30-second clip or sound bite than it is to explain the nuance and complexity of the situation over here on a day to day basis.


            The reality is that the surge is working; at least in one aspect.  We have driven Al Qaeda out or at least underground.  We have created a window of opportunity for the Government of Iraq to step-up and start functioning.  The problem is that they have failed to shake free of sectarianism, corruption and apathy long enough to provide even the most basic of services to its people.

           
           Many of the same problems I saw during my last tour in 2004 still persist today in spite of the billions of dollars we have spent.  Even in this oil rich country, the GOI can’t seem to supply the provinces with nearly enough kerosene or diesel.  The national electrical grid is as antiquated and inadequate today as it was under Sadaam and many villages have power for only a few hours a day if at all.  Many of the large infrastructure projects we fund, such as water or sewer treatment plants languish from neglect of maintenance soon after completion.
 


            New equipment or vehicles paid for by the US often just disappear or are sold on the black market.  There is a complete lack of coordination or communication between agencies at all levels of government.  There is systemic hatred, distrust and crippling power struggles between Shias, Sunnis and Kurds that are not likely disappear any time soon.  There are often far more names on the CLC payrolls than can ever be accounted for or verified.  There is widespread inflated pricing for goods and services provided by local contractors as well as the American companies that operate on the US camps over here.  And, just like today, the American Congress was investigating steroid use in major baseball during my last tour.


            After nearly two years in Iraq, I’ve picked-up enough Arabic to where I can gist out most of a conversation if I pay close enough attention; floos, it means money and the mayor and his directors where giddy with the anticipation of a payout from my Civil Affairs colleague.  I snapped, as much at him for enabling their dependency on US money as at the Iraqis for their shameless greed.


            After a few preliminary comments about budgets and priorities I got progressively angrier and said, “Look, you’ve got to start working your system of government to fund your district.  Iraq is a rich country with lots of oil revenue; you can’t keep depending on us to pay for everything here.  You’ve got to get your country working on its own.  You’ve got to solve these problems for yourself.  We’re not going to be here for ever. 


            “There are people in Diyala who don’t have water.  They don’t have electricity.  They don’t have enough food.  They don’t have anything.  And you’re worried about having your damn offices renovated?  How is that going to help the people out there?  The people are complaining that the government isn’t working.  They say the money isn’t being spent where it needs to be spent.  They say you are stealing money that belongs to the people.  You’ve got to start fixing these problems while the security situation is good or else your country will erupt in violence when we leave.


            “I want to go home too,” I said turning my attention to and wagging my finger at the mayor.  “I haven’t seen my family in a long time and I’d like to go spend time with them, but I’m over here trying to help Iraq and you don’t seem to care about anything but yourself.”


            I got up to leave and as I walked around the table I stopped at the big map on the wall and said, “These are Iraqis.  They’re not Americans.  They’re your people, not mine.  So why the hell do I care more about them than you do?”  Then I left, muttering something about fix your goddamn country while the interpreter sheepishly translated my diatribe.


            After five years, I’d expect the Iraqi government to be a little further along than where they currently are.  After five years, I’d expect the American government to have a slightly more unified, consistent and tougher stance when dealing with the Government of Iraq.  After five years, I’m not sure America can afford to “stay the course” much longer.  And after five years, I’d expect a little more congressional oversight and accounting into the spending associated with the war; but I guess there are more important issues in Washington, such as investigating steroid use in major league baseball.


Barwanah
Sunday 02-03-2008 12:18pm ET


 
            The men sat against the high block wall which separated the filthy street from the dooryard of the residence in Big Barwanah.  They sat on plastic chairs and wooden crates and the trunk of a date palm felled many years ago.  This was their daily ritual in the absence of gainful employment; to sit and watch the activities that transpired in the small village that was little more than a cay in an ocean of palm trees. 

            They smoked cigarettes and spit on the ground and ignored the women as they walked by carrying the 20-liter jugs of water from the canal that skirted the edge of town.  That was their daily ritual, their beastly burden; to bring water from the canal twice a day as their homes had no other source.

            They gave up long ago trying to keep the mud off of their black abayas and they only avoided the small, open sewer trench that ran through the middle of the street by accident.  They spoke in hushed whispers and it was only when they passed the group of men that they fell silent and covered their faces with the loose ends of their black hajabs.

            This was a scene that had probably played out daily for centuries and it would probably play out for centuries to come.  The only difference today was that the village crawled with soldiers and Strykers and the sky thundered with aircraft.

            This was just one of many operations stemming from Wolf Pack Harvest; it was a 48-hour clearing operation that focused on two small villages on the western edge of the Bread Basket.  In many ways the villages of Big Barwanah and its neighbor to the south, Little Barwanah, represent the past, the present and the future of this troubled country.  The two villages are a microcosm of sectarian violence, a controlled experiment in the natural selection of religious intolerance.

            Separated by a mere 200 meters and a swampy palm grove, the two villages have withdrawn into citadels of hatred, violence and distrust, leaving scores dead or wounded and the infrastructure badly crippled.  In the absence of security from the Iraqi government or US forces for more than 18 months, the Sunnis of Big Barwanah fell under the influence of Al Qaeda and the Shia of Little Barwanah under that of the Mahdi Army.

            The villagers shot each other, mortared one another and engaged in kidnap and murder in the name of their respective religious sects.  The swampy, no-man’s land in between the villages was laced with anti-personnel mines and the water and electrical facilities that serviced both, were sabotaged.  The roads leading to the villages were seeded with dozens of deep-buried IEDs and illegal checkpoints deterred travel across the religious fault line.

            In the village of Big Barwanah, the violence wasn’t just reserved for the other side; AQI imposed Sharia Law and enforced it with methodical cruelty.  Women were forced to keep their faces covered at all times.  People were not allowed to smoke or play music or watch television.  One young man said he owned a store nearby that sold game stations and electronics and AQI forced him to close his business.  Another young man said he was kidnapped and beaten for having a picture of his girl friend, on the back of which she had written some endearing statement. 

            Many of the high, mud walls that lined the streets were almost completely riddled with bullets except for several eerie voids in the shapes of human torsos.  The few residents that eventually warmed-up to our presence that first day, spoke of public executions and beatings carried out under the banner of Sharia Law.

            Our mission was to clear every home in both villages of all weapons and establish order.  I moved with Recon Platoon from Hammer Company and the recent loss of their fellow comrades still weighed heavily upon the unit.  Our tried and true routine of good cop/tough cop continued to be our modus operandi throughout the mission.

            On the morning of the second day as we surveyed the mine field between the two villages, an eerie wailing began to emerge from nearby Little Barwanah.  The wailing preceded a screeching sermon from the Imam broadcasting through the loud speakers mounted to the minarets of the village mosque.  The screeching and wailing built to a perpetual crescendo; an intensity that seemed impossible to top but somehow it grew.

            As we stood there in the cold, morning air, we could just make out the procession through the fog that rose from the swampy palm grove.  Hundreds of mourners marched through the streets and screamed and wailed ever louder as the Imam built the frenzy the way a conductor builds a symphony.

            Women knelt in the mud, beat their chests with their fists and cried as if they had just lost a child.  Men walked as if possessed, slapping their faces and clawing their chests with their fingernails.  Some had small, beaded, leather whips with which they drew the blood from their own backs as they screamed and wailed to the cacophony that pierced the morning air.

            At several times during the hour-long ceremony, the generator that powered the loud speakers died and had to be restarted; the power was interrupted but the spectacle went undisturbed.  It was the Shia observance of Ashura, a festival mourning the death of Husain, the grandson and heir apparent to the prophet Muhammad.  It was a scene that played out in hundreds of Shia villages across Iraq that day but I could not imagine a more surreal vantage point from to which to observe it.

            Aside from the proximity to its Shia nemesis to the south, the village of Big Barwanah was unremarkable from every other community in the Bread Basket except in one unfortunate way – an unusually high concentration of mental retardation.  In a 50-meter radius we encountered at least nine young adults with severe cases of retardation. 

            What struck me as odd was the closeness in age of all the cases; they were all between 20 and 25.  I didn’t see any one with the affliction who was older than that and only a handful who were younger.  That fact that nine of the village’s 140 families dealt with this congenital disorder seemed to be a high ratio and that they were all of the same age, seemed to be more than just a random mutation of genes.

            What were the odds; between 20 and 25, both male and female?  I could only hypothesize that since many men in these small, isolated villages seem to have numerous children with multiple wives, perhaps the gene pool here had become a little clouded over time.  To put it bluntly, did the family trees resemble that of a date palm? 

            Or perhaps it was some kind of acute chemical or environmental pollution.  In spite of such a strong reliance on the plentiful bounty provided by nature, there seems to be little regard for the environment in Iraq.  There are no trash cans in the villages for the village itself is the dump.  Hand a child a piece of candy and he will promptly throw the wrapper on the ground as if it were nothing.  Household garbage is simply tossed in to the streets and alleys.  Broken-down automobiles are cannibalized and left to rust where they sit having drained their vital fluids directly on to the ground.

            The source of water for the villages here are the canals; the same canals which are the receptacle for human waste.  The same canals which are clogged by the flotsam and jetsam of a dozen villages along their course.  This, in addition to whatever chemical pollutants are dumped further upstream.

            But those conditions have always existed.  Why didn’t I see as many cases of retardation in children or in older adults?  Maybe the child mortality rate was higher now with the war than it was 20 or 30 years ago and perhaps it was higher still in generations past.  Or maybe whatever pollutants that caused the defects were purged from the system soon after being introduced.

            Days later we returned to the two villages with Iraqi and American physicians to perform a Combined Medical Engagement (CME).  The doctors examined patients, diagnosed illness and dispensed medication to over 500 people.  A CME is like a roving sick-call to treat minor injuries and illness with bandages and cough syrup.

            With the majority of the village’s population concentrated at the respective CMEs, I was able to see that my previous observation was partly incorrect.  At these two events, I could see numerous children, of all ages, afflicted with congenital physical and mental developmental problems.  It wasn’t just the nine young adults I had seen that first day in Big Barwanah; it was a score or more of children of all ages from both villages. 

            There was little care we could provide with a one-day CME from the back of a truck except refer them to long-term care at an inadequate hospital 25 kilometers away; and 25 kilometers can be a world away when you travel roads laced with IEDs. 

            The sad fact is that even long-term medical care is helpless to make any real difference to those afflicted or their families.  Long-term medical care can not go back in time and change the circumstances that created the disorder to begin with.

            Maybe in that sense the CME is symbolic of our efforts in Iraq from the beginning; trying first-aid cures on a country and a culture we perceive as being congenitally ill.  To wear-out a well-worn cliché even further, perhaps we’re trying to put a band-aid on a sucking chest wound.

            Is a temporary, increased presence in a village really going to change a thousand years of religious intolerance and hatred?  Can an American soldier really be expected to reason with a man who beats himself to the point of bleeding over the death of someone 1300 years ago?

            In spite of our good intentions and best efforts, a hundred years from now men will still be sitting on that fallen palm trunk as women carry water from the sewage and garbage filled canals of Little and Big Barwanah.

Contact Captain Keller